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The present paper attempts to respond to criticisms made by Keating (1988, 
Developmental Review, 8, 376-384) regarding the present author’s earlier paper 
which described a recasted model of formal operations (Bymes, 1988, Develop- 
mental Review, 8, 66-87). This earlier paper made a distinction between concep- 
tual and procedural knowledge at the level of formal operations, and presented 
evidence supporting this recasted model. Keating (1988) argues that the recasted 
model fails to capture what Piaget originally intended, that it fails to incorporate 
a procedural knowledge component, and that there is some question as to what 
would constitute empirical support for the model. The present paper discusses 
each of these criticisms and others in turn, and clarifies earlier arguments. 0 19X8 
Academic Preaa, Inc. 
In a previous paper (Byrnes, 1988), I proposed a reformulation of the 
formal operations model originally described by Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958) and revised in Piaget (1972a). In that paper, I argued that reasoning 
domains consist of two components: “knowing that” knowledge and 
“knowing how” knowledge (Ryle, 1971). The former is analogous to what 
has been called conceptual knowledge (Hiebert & LeFevre, 1987) or de- 
clarative knowledge (Mandler, 1983). It consists of networks of the core 
concepts for a given domain. “Knowing how” knowledge is simply a 
representation of the steps one should take in order to solve a problem. It 
has been more recently referred to as procedural knowledge (Anderson, 
1976; Mandler, 1983). In the domain of physics, for example, “knowing 
that” (conceptual) knowledge would consist of an understanding of the 
relation between the core concepts “force” and “mass.” “Knowing 
how” (procedural) knowledge, on the other hand, would consist of know- 
ing how to, for example, solve introductory physics text problems using 
formulas and the like. Such forms of knowledge are obviously distinct as 
indicated by the ability of students to correctly solve problems using rote 
procedures, while at the same time failing to comprehend the core con- 
cepts and their interrelations (see Carey, 1985, or Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 
1982). 
In my paper, I drew a distinction between conceptual and procedural 
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knowledge with regards to formal operational thought. I argued that the 
16 binary operations represent a formalized model of conceptual knowl- 
edge that includes the propositional concepts of implication, disjunction, 
equivalence, and conjunction, as well as their interrelations. Piaget also 
discussed formal operational schemata such as isolation of variables, 
combinations, etc., which I categorized as instances of procedural knowl- 
edge. My primary point was that too much emphasis has been placed on 
the formal operational schemata in the American literature, and too little 
placed on the propositional concepts available to a formal operational 
subject. I argued that this was due to the fact that the only translated work 
on formal operations was Inhelder and Piaget (1958) which, also placed a 
lot of emphasis on the schemata. Moreover, these authors failed to keep 
conceptual and procedural knowledge distinct in this work by using the 
formalism for the conceptual knowledge to characterize procedural 
knowledge. In my reformulation, I attempted to make the distinction 
clear. Moreover, I used Lakatos’ (1971) characterization of theories to 
propose that the essential, nondeletable features of the theory of formal 
operations are (a) operations on operations, (b) propositional representa- 
tion, (c) all possible combinations, and (d) hypothetical thinking. I dis- 
cussed conceptual knowledge in the context of these features. I then 
attempted to show how these features have achieved a much higher level 
of empirical support than was found for the schemata. 
Keating in his recent commentary on my paper (Keating, 1988) argues, 
in general, that my reformulation fails to capture what Piaget originally 
intended, that my view is regressive rather than progressive, and that 
there is a question of validity (in the methodological sense) in my discus- 
sion of what constitutes empirical support for my model. He makes the 
following specific criticisms that I would like to discuss in turn: (a) It is 
mistaken to say that the structural organization of the 16 binary opera- 
tions is what the theory really is about and that the know-how aspects of 
the theory can be deleted without harm to the theory. (b) My paper 
dismisses the tension between closed structures and open systems. (c) My 
model idealizes a propositional logic as an end goal and isolates structure 
from function. (d) Psychometricians would be troubled by the claim that 
propositional reasoning tasks are “direct” tests of formal operations. (e) 
People’s actual performance on Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958) tasks is not 
irrelevant. (f) My paper omitted Piaget’s (1972b) important paper regard- 
ing content effects. (g) My model ignores factors such as content knowl- 
edge. (h) Byrnes and Overton’s (1986) data are not supportive of the new 
model. (i) What is left is a decontextualized mirage of the mind. 
With regards to criticism a, I can simply say that I do not believe that 
the “knowing how” aspects can be deleted from the theory. My point was 
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that conceptual and procedural knowledge are co-equals and that not 
enough attention has been given to the former. However, since I mistak- 
enly failed to include procedural knowledge as a core feature in my earlier 
paper, it is easy to see why Keating makes this criticism. I concede that 
procedural knowledge should be added as an additional feature. How- 
ever, I agree with Siegler (1986) that it is erroneous to believe that all 
subjects will correctly solve a problem using the same procedure or strat- 
egy. Particularly with complex problems, there are often multiple paths to 
the same correct answer (though some are more effective than others). 
Hence, it is possible that someone who fails to employ the correct formal 
operational strategy will be misclassified as nonformal. For example, with 
a combinations task, one subject may generate the following combina- 
tions from the letters ABCD: A,B,C,D,AB,AC,AD,BC,BD,CD,ABC, 
ABD,BCD,ABCD. Note the systematicity of this solution. Another sub- 
ject likewise “knows” (in the conceptual knowledge sense) that there are 
combinations of one, two, three, and four letters, yet was never taught or 
discovered a system. He is likely to generate: AB,A,CD,ABD,ABCD, 
etc. The former is labeled formal operational because she generated all 
the combinations, and the latter is labeled nonformal because he did not. 
Hence, a deficiency in procedural knowledge is overgeneralized to con- 
ceptual knowledge as well. It is in this sense that I argued in my earlier 
paper that tests of schemata are indirect assessments of concepptuat 
knowledge. This account explains why it is relatively easy to elicit formal 
operations in adolescents with minimal feedback as Stone and Day (1980) 
describe. What is really taught with feedback is a more effective strategy 
that subjects understand as such because they have necessary conceptual 
knowledge. What information-processing theorists and functionalists fail 
to realize is that there is something more to training than the acquisition 
of procedures, i.e., conceptual knowledge. 
In regard to criticism b, I do not dismiss the tension between open and 
closed systems. Rather, I make a distinction between how knowledge is 
organized in the mind and the theorist’s model of that organization. Con- 
sider the following progression in a structuralist’s theorizing about rea- 
soning. He or she observes and records a subject say on separate occa- 
sions: (1) “If it’s past 4 o’clock, she’s home. [finds clock] It’s 4: 15. She’s 
home. (2) “If today’s the 15th, my paper is due. [asks friend] Today’s the 
15th? Oh no, my paper is due!” Next the theorist detects a formal sim- 
ilarity in these arguments and attempts to summarize them with a formal- 
ism: They all have the form “If p then 9; p, therefore q”. The theorist 
uses this schema as a model of the actual thought processes. Up to this 
point he or she has not erred. However, as is usually the case, this 
structuralist makes the fallacious assumption that this model or formalism 
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actually exists in the subject’s mind as an abstract, formal entity waiting 
to become filled in with content. In this way a logical formalism becomes 
reified and idealized in Keating’s sense. 
The problem here is not with the claim that there are inferences that 
have the same structure in the mind, but, rather, with the claim that the 
formalism exists in the mind. A further problem arises when the struc- 
turalist attempts to prove the internal cohension of this model to the 
scientific or philosophical community. As Godel’s proof showed, the only 
way for one to prove the internal consistency of one’s model or system is 
by appealing to the next more powerful system (see Nagel & Newman, 
1958). Additionally, immediately as one posits a formal model as a theo- 
retical description, one has to place constraints on the kinds of contents 
which can enter this system (see Chomsky, 1965, pp. 75-79, for example, 
on semantic constraints on synactic rewrite rules). These limits of for- 
malization have always led to the rejection of a structuralist approach 
(see, for example, Faulconer & Williams, 1985, on the value of the her- 
meneutic over structuralist approaches). 
Keating is correct in his belief that Piaget recognized the limits of 
formalization. Piaget (1962) had the following to say regarding the relation 
between formalized logics and natural thought: 
it is important to have all efforts directed towards the relations between these 
formalized logics and the corresponding non-formalized forms of thought. These 
latter forms of thought, called “naive theories” by logicians of the trade, concern 
natural thought, but of a very superior level to that which concerns us in this work 
[i.e., nonspecialized ordinary thought], whereas the contemporary formalized log- 
its have essentially the goal of furnishing a foundation for natural mathematical 
thought. . . But however elaborated this natural thought of a superior level may 
be, as opposed to ordinary thought, it is still the case that logical formalisms have 
failed to structure thought completely and coherently, in other words, there are 
limits to formalization. . But the central idea that J. B. Grize defends is without 
doubt that the limits of formalisms are an index of their efftcacy and not of their 
weakness, once the relations between formalization and natural thought are made 
precise. But the reason why a formal model does not recover everything which is 
natural is because, on the one hand, one only formalizes by abstracting from the 
given data, and, on the other, because a formalism does not constitute a stable state 
of immutable frontiers, but, on the contrary, represents an activiry of formaliza- 
tion. Certainly the development of natural thought does not proceed by additive 
accumulations, but in a form of an organic growth. A formalization, however, is 
atemporal. As a result . . . contradictions play a positive role in the evolution of 
natural thought because they contribute to advancements, whereas in a formalism, 
contradictions are to be avoided. But it nonetheless remains that rough drafts, that 
are always made cleaner through formalization, are observed in the successive 
stages of natural thought, of the sort that, on the whole, there never exists a purely 
naive state nor a pure formalization. (pp. 4-6) 
Piaget refers in the course of this discussion to papers by Ladriere 
(1967) and Apostel (1967), who summarize the limits of formalization 
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presented by Godel, Church, Turing, and others. He also remarked that 
there will always be a lack of tit between formalisms and thought because 
the former are changed and developed by theorists in a linear fashion, 
whereas natural thought progresses through dialectical cycles. It is my 
contention that he gave up the method of using formalisms based on these 
arguments, but remained a structuralist. Montangero (1985, p. 33) cites a 
discussion with Piaget precisely on this point. Regardless, what all these 
authors refer to is a defect in the process of formalization or modeling, not 
one in the claim that adolescents acquire concepts of implication, disjunc- 
tion, etc. Since I do not believe that adolescents have free-floating for- 
malisms in their minds, but, rather, actual content domains organized in 
the form of implication, disjunction, etc., I am not troubled by the issues 
of the limits of formalization. I agree with Keating that where most struc- 
turalists go wrong is in reifying the model and attributing it to the subject’s 
mind. 
Regarding criticism c, I do not see how my depiction isolates structure 
from function. I attempted only to isolate the organizational aspect of 
formal operations in order to describe its importance. By omitting a dis- 
cussion of process in my paper, I do not imply that process is unimpor- 
tant. Rather, one must distinguish between organization (structure) and 
organizing (process). Piaget argued that knowledge is always character- 
ized by a certain organization at a certain level of abstraction away from 
action or perception. He formalized these organizations at various levels 
by calling them structures. These structures represent frames which are 
imposed on reality in order to organize information for any given context, 
i.e., to construct meaning. He called successful organizing assimilation. 
The organization of knowledge I described in my paper represents cog- 
nitive structures which the adolescent and adult use as a frame when 
organizing/assimilating information. 
With respect to criticism d, it should be noted that I consider proposi- 
tional reasoning tasks to be more direct tests of formal operational con- 
ceptual knowledge than the standard tasks which measure schemata or 
procedural knowledge (see also my comments to criticism a above). I by 
no means claim that the former tasks are “direct” measures, as if the 
tasks represent entirely valid (in the psychometric sense) operational def- 
initions of formal operational thought. My claim is simply that they are 
much better measures of conceptual knowledge than standard tasks. Ob- 
viously one could devise many other tasks to determine the nature of the 
organization at the formal operations level (e.g., Carey’s, 1985, creative 
tasks). Moreover, propositional reasoning tasks do not measure proce- 
dural knowledge and are in this way too narrow (as Keating notes). 
It should be clear at this point that the key issue is the nature of the 
relation between conceptual and procedural knowledge at the formal op- 
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erations level. It is only a moderate step forward to have made the dis- 
tinction and to indicate how to measure each component separately. True 
advancement in the area of adolescent reasoning would be to determine 
the nature of this link. While interested parties, including myself, work 
out this relation, it should be noted that such an endeavor would not even 
be undertaken if the distinction between forms of knowledge had not been 
made. 
Criticisms e, f, and g are really about the same issue: the role of content 
knowledge at the formal operations level. As researchers in the area of 
mathematics are beginning to realize (e.g., Hiebert & LeFevre, 1987), 
procedures can be learned in a meaningless rote fashion, but generaliza- 
tion of these procedures across contexts does not occur unless a rich 
conceptual knowledge base is present. With respect to formal operations, 
consider a specific example of the isolation of variables procedure. A 
novice and an expert car mechanic are each presented with an engine that 
will not start. The expert possesses a rich conceptual knowledge base 
consisting of the information that at least six engine parts could be de- 
fective. He also knows that certain parts work in concert. The novice 
considers only one or two parts as possibly implicated and does not 
consider their interrelation. Clearly, the expert will employ the isolation 
of variables technique of testing and replacing parts in a very different 
manner than the novice because of differences in conceptual knowledge. 
Piaget (1972b) made the point that it is possible to be formal operational 
only in one’s area of expertise. I endorse this point of view, as indicated 
by my discussion of form and content in my earlier paper. I think, how- 
ever, Piaget is fundamentally wrong when he says form is independent of 
content at the formal operations level. In contrast, I think it is more 
correct to say that hypothetical reasoning (i.e., reasoning about content 
which the subject knows is false, or may only be possibly true) is possible 
because propositions are the content of formal operations thought. Prop- 
ositions can be about anything the subject chooses. When Piaget says that 
an adolescent reasons like a scientist, he must surely mean they reason 
hypothetically, not that they reason about IZO content (i.e., contentless 
formalisms). 
Regarding criticism h, Keating makes the point that subjects who com- 
prehend implication should respond “can’t tell” to the arguments Denial 
of Antecedent and Affirmation of Consequent, and “no” to the Modus 
Tollens argument. In fact, as he notes, 39% of the older subjects in Byrnes 
and Overton (1986) incorrectly responded “can’t tell” to Modus Tollens. 
Keating regards this finding as indicating an overgeneralization of this 
response due to a familiarity with logic language. What is not published in 
this paper, however, is the analysis of subjects’ comments regarding their 
answers. Only the older subjects (and adults in later studies) respond 
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“can’t tell” to syllogism: “If it rains, then the grass gets wet. The grass 
is dry; has it rained?” Here, subjects asked the experimenter: “How long 
ago did it rain? The grass could be dry by now.” Since the experimenter 
did not give any further information due to a concern for standardization, 
the subjects responded “can’t tell.” This response does not reflect an 
overgeneralization but, rather, a recognition that Modus Tollens applies 
in some cases but not others. Here, they failed to accept the entailment 
relation between the antecedent and consequent; i.e., they would not 
accept that the case “It rained and the grass is dry” is impossible. It is in 
cases like these where it is uninformative to say that subjects need to be 
simply familiar with the content to do well. Rather, the content must be 
familiar and organized in a form which reflects implication, etc. (see my 
earlier paper regarding organization and negation). 
Regarding Keating’s last criticism that my model is a decontextualized 
mirage of mind, it can simply be said that any formalized model, by 
definition, is decontextualized. It seeks to describe a formal similarity 
among individual cognitions such as inferences that have the form of 
Modus Ponens. As Piaget (1970) remarks, structuralism is a method 
which seeks to summarize across a variety of discrete behaviors using 
formalisms. One cannot take this formalism abstracted from mind, sub- 
ject it to tests as a mathematician or logician would, and expect it to 
function as the mind does. The theorist’s model should aim toward de- 
scriptive and explanatory adequacy regarding the working of the mind 
(Chomsky, 1965, pp. 33-47), not toward passing a mathematician’s test of 
internal consistency. Godel, Church, and others have shown how models 
can be defective in a mathematical sense (e.g., generating contradictory 
formuli). I think this finding is irrelevant to psychological description and 
explanation. The primary reason for (1) retaining the parts of the formal 
operations model that I describe and (2) modifying the model concerning 
the relation between conceptual and procedural knowledge, is because it 
is important to strive for descriptive and explanatory adequacy in regard 
to adolescent thinking. Hence, abandoning entirely all the aspects of the 
formal operations model as Keating, information processors, and func- 
tionalist seem to desire is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
Such a move would be much more regressive than retaining parts of the 
model and modifying the remainder to better explain the data. 
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